Abstract-In this study, the security of Novel Enhanced Quantum Representation (NEQR) of quantum images are suggested by using the Quantum Fourier Transform (QF T ) with blind trent. In the protocol, QF T and keys are used to share signature with recipients. So all members know only their signature information which are encrypted output of the QF T . This improves the security of the protocol. In addition, the security of the protocol is provided by using reorder QF T output qubits with permutation of the blind trent. The security analysis expresses security of the transfer of the image with effective secret key usage.
Introduction
Conventional image security techniques, such as digital watermarking and image encryption, are commonly used to protect the image effectively. Possible threats in image transmission are capturing of image by unauthorized persons and authentication of the image. These issues are very important for special applications such as transmission of military satellite images or patient records.
There are many quantum image representations such as the "Qubit Lattice" representation for encoding a quantum image [1] , the "Real KET" representation [2] , Flexible Representation of Quantum Image (FRQI) [3] , Multi-Channel Representation for Quantum Images (MCQI) [4] , Novel Enhanced Quantum Representation (NEQR) [5] , Quantum Image Representation for Log-Polar Images (QUALPI) [6] , Simple Quantum Representation of Infrared Images (SQR) [7] , Quantum States for M Colors and N Coordinates (QSMC & QSNC) [8] , Normal Arbitrary Quantum Superposition State (NAQSS) [9] and Quantum RGB Multi-Channel Representation (QMCR) [10] .
Also, in the literature there some studies on the security of quantum images. Iliyasu et. al. [11] proposed the WaQI scheme based on restricted geometric transformations for quantum image watermarking and authentication. Iliyasu et. al. [12] proposed the improved WaQI scheme which is secure, keyless, blind and perfectly usable for authentication of the image owner. Later, Iliyasu et. al. [13] proposed GWaQI scheme with two-tier for greyscale quantum image watermarking and recovery. Yan et. al. [14] proposed MC WAQI model based on MCQI representation for color quantum images.
In this study, we propose the protocol based on
the QF T with blind Trent for image security and authentication. The paper can be outlined as follows; in Section 2,basic concepts of QF T and N EQR are explained; In Section 3, base stages of the protocol based on QF T with blind trent are introduced. In Section 4, the security analysis of the protocol according to forgery and repudiation concepts are given. In Section 5, in the conclusion, some results are discussed.
Related Works

Quantum Fourier Transform
Quantum Fourier transform is a application of classical discrete Fourier transform to the quantum states [15] . The QF T transform of an orthonormal basis set |0 , |1 , ..., |N − 1 can be defined as follows [15] :
Where N = 2 n and orthonormal basis set is |0 , |1 , ..., |2 n − 1 . The |x state can be written in binary form as x = x 0 x 1 ...x N −1 . The circuit of Quantum Fourier Transform for |x can be seen in Fig.1 . The |x state is transformed into the phase of qubits as results of the QF T transform. 
NEQR
NEQR uses the basis states of qubit sequence to store the color values. it represents grayscale images. Suppose the gray scale of images is 2 q .
Binary sequence
Y X encodes the grayscale value f (Y, X) of the corresponding pixel (Y, X) as follows [5] :
The representative expression of a quantum image for a 2 n × 2 n image can be written as follows [5] :
The Protocol based on QFT with Blind Trent for NEQR Image
The participants of the protocol are Alice, Bob and Trent. Alice would like to send 2 q grayscale 2 n × 2 n NEQR quantum image |I to Bob by encrypting.In this case N = q + 2n. Blind Trent is assumed as a manager of the protocol. Blind Trent manages some communication to provide security of the protocol. Bob can obtain and verify the image |I with help of the blind Trent.
The protocol can be described with following phases. [16] , [17] . The secret keys are used to encrypt quantum image to prevent any attackers. The encryption algorithm is given in Eq. 10 and Eq. 11. The length of the all keys are with NEQR model . We assume that the length of the |I is | |I | = N .
Where
Blind Trent creates a permutation P of a set of {1, 2, ..., N } as follows [18] :
P (i) can be expressed in binary string as follows:
Where k = log 2 (P (i)). Then Blind Trent prepares a quantum state |P (i) from P binary (i) using by computational bases (0→|0 and 1→|1 ). Then blind Trent prepares a quantum state of |P as follows:
Blind Trent creates encrypted versions of that permutation as follows:
E K (.) is a quantum one-time pad encryption algorithm which is firstly defined by Kim et. al. [19] and used by Yılmaz [18] to improve security of the protocol against forgery attacks.
To further improve the security of this quantum encryption algorithm, we reorganized the algorithm of Zhang et. al. [20] as follows:
Due to using T , encrypted message cannot be forged [19] . Where the key length is |K| = 8N . Then, blind Trent sends encrypted |P A to Alice via quantum channel. (iv) Alice decrypts |P A and makes measurement to obtain P [18] . (v) Alice applies QF T to NEQR image and obtains following state:
Where N = q+2n. Also we show it as follows:
Signing Phase
(i) Alice reorder QF T (|I i ) states with permutation of blind Trent.
|A(Q) =SW AP (P (i))(QF T (|I
(ii) Alice encrypts all qubits of Eq. 13 with secret key K AB .
|A(S) =E
(iii) Alice sends |A(S) to Bob via quantum channel. (iv) Alice encrypts QF T (|I i ) with secret key K AB with the encryption algorithm [18] (see references there in) and sends to blind Trent via quantum channel.
(v) Blind Trent encrypts the |AT (S) with the secret key K T B .
|T B(S) = E K T B (|AT (S) )
Then, blind Trent sends the above encrypted state to Bob via quantum channel. 
Verification Phase
QF T (|I
(iv) Bob applies QF T −1 and gets |I i , then makes measurement onto that states as stage of the image retrieving in [5] and obtainsĪ. Bob checks equality ofĨ andĪ. IfĨ =Ī, Bob will announce that the signature is valid, otherwise the signature is rejected and the protocol is aborted. If the image is valid, then Bob encrypts the valid image I with encryption algorithm.
Then Bob sends |BT (S) to blind Trent. (v) Blind Trent decrypts |BT (S) with secret key K BT and measures the states as the stage of image retrieving in [5] and obtainsĪ.
(vi) Blind Trent also asks Alice for sending I to him. Alice encrypts the valid image I with encryption algorithm.
Then Alice sends |AT (S) to blind Trent. (vii) Trent decrypts |AT (S) with secret key K AT and measures the states as the stage of image retrieving in [5] and obtainsĨ. Blind Trent checks the equality of theĨ andĪ. If they are equal then stores the image I with Alice's identification for later traceability.
Security Analysis
Main requirements of the quantum digital signature protocols to provide unconditionally security are that the signature should not be repudiated by the signatory, and any attacker cannot forgery signatory's signature.
Impossibility of Forgery
Firstly, we consider insider attacker for the protocol. We assume that Bob is illegal participant and wants to create a signature of Alice. Even if Bob knows the details of the signature protocol he cannot create Alice's signature because of blind Trent. Bob cannot create Alice's signature without knowledge of blind Trent. After the end of the legal signature protocol, Bob may change correct image I toĪ. Because of the knowledge about correct I of blind Trent, Bob cannot achieve forgery.
Secondly, any attacker may try to forge Alice's signature. Any attacker cannot achieve forgery because the states in the results of the QF T (|I i ) can be reordered with blind Trent's permutation to produce a correct signature of Alice. Even if any attacker can get the permutation, the permutation will be changed by blind Trent for every signature session. Blind Trent must be part of the protocol. So any attacker cannot achieve collective forgery. Further, any attacker may change QF T (|I i ) state by applying unitary transformation. Then, Bob and blind Trent can decide changed state by comparing I andĪ.
Impossibility of Repudiation
In the protocol, Alice and Bob cannot repudiate the signature because of the management of protocol by blind Trent. Blind Trent controls some communication steps of the protocol. If Alice can send different| I to the blind Trent and claim that the signature is not mine. Blind Trent can check the equality of the| I from Alice and| I from Bob. Blind Trent can decide whether the signature protocol is valid or not.
Conclusion
Security of NEQR Quantum Image by Using Quantum Fourier Transform with Blind Trent is suggested. Alice expresses the image |I into phasespace by using QF T . So the image |I is expressed in phases of the output qubits of QF T . This improves the image security. Alice changes order of the output qubits of the QF T according to permutation information which is sent by blind Trent. So any attacker does not know order of the qubits and also they cannot create a valid signature.
In the encrypting algorithm, the length of keys is increased to the 8-bit to improve the security. Any information (classical or quantum) in the protocol is sent by using encryption algorithm which is robust against forgery by insider/outsider attacker. Furthermore, decoy states can be used to be aware of Eve. order of the qubits to the Bob to obtain real message |I by using QF T −1 .
The above security analysis implies that given protocol based on QF T provides unconditionally security. In addition, our protocol provides higher efficiency, effective secret key usage and security for the transfer of NEQR images.
